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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
I.

Whether the district court erred when it imposed a three-year suspension upon
the Respondent, Jonathan W. Grimes, when the court found that Mr. Grimes
had committed misconduct when handling the funds of his client, but also found
compelling mitigating circumstances.

II.

In reviewing sanctions imposed for attorney discipline actions, the Court should
presume the findings of fact in the lower court are correct. See Matter of
Discipline ofBabilis, 951 P.2d 207 (Utah 1997). The court should not overturn
findings of fact unless "unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in error."
See id. If the evidence warrants, the Court may make an independent judgment
regarding the appropriate level of discipline, but the Court should "always give
serious consideration to the findings and rulings of the district court." See id.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The following rules of professional conduct are at issue in this action:
Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.4 (Communication), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.5 (Fees), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 8.4 (Misconduct), Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 14-603 (Sanction), Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rule 14-604 (Imposition of Sanctions), Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
Rule 14-607 (Aggravation and Mitigation), Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This is an appeal from an attorney discipline action in which the
district court suspended the Respondent, Jordan W. Grimes, for three years after finding that he
engaged in misconduct when handling $7,070 in fees paid by one of his clients. Although Judge
L.A. Dever recognized that the presumptive sanction for Mr. Grimes' conduct was disbarment,
Judge Dever found the mitigating circumstances compelling enough to warrant imposing a threeyear suspension with specific probationary terms instead. The Office of Professional Conduct
(OPC) initiated this appeal, arguing Judge Dever erred when departing from the presumptive
sanction in response to mitigating circumstances.
The Course of Proceedings: The OPC filed a complaint against Mr. Grimes on June 20,
2008. On June 2, 2010, the district court presided over a trial to determine whether Mr. Grimes
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"). The district court found that Grimes
violated Rules 1.2(a) (Scope of Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4(a) (Communication); 1.5(a)
(Fees); 8.4(a),(c), and (d) (Misconduct), and issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
The matter then proceeded to a sanctions hearing on November 8, 2010.
Disposition in the Trial Court: At the Sanctions hearing, the district court heard
evidence of the mitigating circumstances at issue during the period of Mr. Grimes' misconduct.
On February 4, 2011, the court issued an Order of Sanction imposing a three-year suspension
6
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rather than disbannent, in light of the mitigating circumstances and in the interest of justice. The
court also imposed probation on Mr. Grimes, during which he was to reimburse his client for the
misused funds, complete an ethics and professional conduct course acceptable to the OPC, and
report to a supervising attorney selected by OPC. Upon returning to active practice, Mr. Grimes'
client funds are to be monitored by the supervising attorney.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Mr. Grimes became a member of the Utah State Bar in 2005.

2.

In June 2005, Mr. Bill Riordan hired Mr. Grimes to represent him in a
discrimination case. Mr. Riordan was Mr. Grimes' first client.

3.

At the time, Mr. Grimes worked for attorney J. Kent Holland.

4.

Mr. Riordan paid Mr. Grimes a $10,000 retainer, which was placed in Mr.
Holland's attorney trust account.

5.

Mr. Grimes left Mr. Holland's firm sometime iri 2006.

6.

Mr. Riordan indicated he wanted to continue working with Mr. Grimes, so Mr.
Grimes retrieved Mr. Riordan's file from Mr. Holland.

7.

On June 9, 2006, Mr. Holland's secretary gave Mr. Grimes a check in the amount
of $7,070.

8.

The Memo line of the check bore Mr. Riordan's name, but Mr. Grimes believed
some portion of the money was owed to him by Mr. Holland for Mr. Grimes'
work on other cases. (R. 174-175.)

9.

Mr. Grimes failed to communicate with Mr. Riordan from approximately January
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2007 to December 2007.
10.

During that time, Mr. Grimes experienced a number of personal and financial
problems.

11.

Mr. Grimes did not effectively pursue Mr. Riordan's case, resulting in its
dismissal.

12.

On December 17, 2007, Mr. Grimes sent a letter to Mr. Riordan explaining the
situation and apologizing for not pursuing the case more effectively. (R. 169.)

13.

Mr. Grimes then timely re-filed Mr. Riordan's case. (R. 177.)

14.

Mr. Grimes failed to return the $7,070 to Mr. Riordan, as Mr. Grimes believed he
was owed the funds for services rendered to Mr. Riordan and in previous cases for
Mr. Holland.

15.

On December 22, 2008, Mr. Riordan sent a letter to Mr. Grimes asking for an
accounting of his retainer and requesting the unused portion be sent to his new
attorney.

16.

The OPC filed a Notice of Informal Complaint (NOIC) on Mr. Grimes on January
17,2008.

17.

Mr. Grimes did not respond to the NOIC.

18.

A hearing was held before a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline
Committee of the Utah State Bar on March 28, 2008.

19.

The Screening Panel directed the OPC to file a formal complaint against Mr.
Grimes in the District Court in this matter.
8
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20.

The District Court found that Mr. Grimes' mishandling of Mr. Riordan's retainer
violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: 1.2(a) (Scope of
Representation); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4(a) (Communication); 1.5(a) (Fees);
8.4(a),(c), and (d) (Misconduct).

21.

The District Court concluded that the presumptive sanction for Mr. Grimes'
conduct was disbarment, but recognized that this sanction could be reduced if
there were compelling mitigating circumstances.

22.

The District Court found the following mitigating factors:
a. Mr. Grimes had no prior record of discipline before the bar.
b. Mr. Grimes had did not have experience in the practice of law before taking
on Mr. Riordan's case, as he had only just received his license.
c. Mr. Grimes faced emotional problems during the period of his misconduct. He
experienced marital problems, extreme financial difficulties, depression,
suicidal ideation, and the hospitalization and passing away of his infant child
in a short span of time.
d. Mr. Grimes has removed himself from the area of civil law and concentrates
on criminal defense.
e. Mr. Grimes now has a good reputation as a criminal defense attorney, is hard
working, and is considered to be honest.
f. Mr. Grimes no longer handles client funds.

23.

In light of the evidence presented, the District Court concluded that justice would
9
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not be served by disbarment.
24.

Instead, the District Court suspended Mr. Grimes from the practice of law for
three years, with all but 181 days of the suspension stayed, and imposed probation
subject to various terms.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court's decision to suspend Mr. Grimes, rather than disbar him, is consistent
with established law. The district court correctly recognized that the presumptive sanction for
Mr. Grimes' misconduct was disbarment, and also correctly recognized that this sanction can be
reduced in light of compelling mitigating circumstances. The court found compelling mitigating
circumstances in this case and appropriately reduced the sanction in the interest of justice. The
OPC's argument that this runs contrary to established law is without merit, as no Utah court has
specifically defined what mitigating factors are "compelling" enough to warrant departing from
disbarment. Furthermore, Mr. Grimes' conduct is distinguishable from those cases in which
disbarment has been imposed, and his mitigating factors are more numerous. Many out of state
courts have imposed suspension rather than disbarment in cases with mitigating circumstances
similar to those at issue. Finally, the district court correctly applied this Court's reasoning in
Crawley to craft an appropriate sanction that takes into account all the circumstances of Mr.
Grimes' case. Accordingly, Mr. Grimes asks the Court to uphold the ruling of the district court.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court's Decision to Reduce the Presumptive Sanction of
Disbarment to a Lesser Sanction was Consistent with Established Law and
Appropriate to Mr. Grimes' Individual Case.

The presumptive standard for Mr. Grimes' actions under the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions is disbarment, but this Court has repeatedly held that departure from this
sanction maybe warranted in light of compelling mitigating circumstances. The district court
expressly recognized this rule and correctly applied it, finding mitigating factors compelling
enough to warrant imposing a three-year suspension rather than disbarment. Furthermore, the
district court properly applied the reasoning of the Crawley decision to craft an appropriate
sanction that serves the purposes of attorney discipline in Mr. Grimes' individual case.
a. The District Court correctly recognized that departure from the
presumptive disbarment sanction was warranted upon a finding of
compelling mitigating circumstances.
The OPC is correct that in cases of intentional misappropriation of client funds, the
presumptive sanction is disbarment. See Brief of the Petitioner/Appellant at p. 6; Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Rule 14-605; Babilis, 951 P.2d at 216. The key word, however, is
"presumptive." Rule 14-605, cited by the OPC as the rule requiring disbarment in this case,
begins by explaining "Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer . .," suggesting a
degree of flexibility. See Rule 14-605(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, Rule 14-602, which sets
out the framework for using the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, states the rules
"permit[] flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of lawyer
11
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misconduct" and are "designed to promote consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the
appropriate level of sanction in an individual case" See Rule 14-602(d) (emphasis added). To
that end, the rules provide a procedure for departing from the presumptive sanction in light of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. See Rule 14-607; Babilis, 951 P.2d at 215. Finally, this
Court has emphasized:
[AJlthough they are extremely useful guidelines and will be accorded deference in
the vast majority of cases, this court is not restricted by the Rules of Professional
Conduct in evaluating whether an attorney should be disbarred. Rather, [it]
examine[s] all relevant facts and circumstances in attempting to determine what
punishment, if any, is appropriate to deter similar conduct and to protect the
public.
In re Discipline of Harding, 2004 UT 100, \ 22 104 P.3d 1220, 1225 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, although the presumptive sanction for misappropriation of funds is disbarment, that
presumption is far from dispositive.
In each case cited by the OPC where disbarment was ordered for misappropriation of
funds, the court emphasized that "significant" or "compelling" mitigating circumstances could
warrant departure from that presumptive sanction. See Babilis, 951 P.2d at 216; Matter of
Discipline oflnce, 957 P.2d 1233, 1238 (Utah 1998); In re Discipline ofEnnenga, 2001 UT 111,
H 10, 37 3 P.3d 1150, 1154; In re Discipline of Johnson, 2001 UT 110, If 9, 48 P.3d 881, 884.
Therefore, the OPC's contention that "the district court did not have discretion to reduce the
sanction in this case" is without merit. The caselaw expressly gives the court permission to
reduce the sanction in light of compelling mitigating circumstances, and Judge Dever correctly
annunciated this standard before considering the mitigating circumstances in this case. See Order
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of Sanction at p. 9 ("Pursuant to the standards, the intentional misappropriation of a client's
funds will result in disbarment absent 'truly compelling mitigating circumstances.'")
b. The District Court correctly found compelling mitigating circumstances
to warrant departing from the presumptive sanction.
1.

Mr. Grimes' Mitigating; Factors

After correctly annunciating the standard for departing from presumptive disbarment in
cases of misappropriation, the district court recognized a number of compelling mitigating
circumstances in this case.
First, Mr. Riordan was Mr. Grimes' very first client. Mr. Grimes had little experience in
the practice of law prior to handling Mr. Riordan's funds. He had no prior experience with
employment discrimination cases, like Mr. Riordan's. (R. 164.). Due to his lack of experience,
Mr. Grimes had to make extra effort to diligently research every aspect of the case before
performing work for Mr. Riordan. (R. 164.) This contributed to the delay in pursuing Mr.
Riordan's case. Mr. Grimes informed Mr. Riordan of his lack of prior experience in such matters,
but Mr. Riordan chose to continue to be represented by Mr. Grimes, even after he had left Mr.
Holland's employ
Second, Mr. Grimes had no record of prior discipline before the bar.
Third, Mr. Grimes suffered a number of personal problems during the period of
misconduct. During his time working for Mr. Holland, Mr. Grimes was rarely paid for his work.
(See R. 351:78:15-18.) This led to extreme financial hardship. Mr. Grimes made $13,000 in one
year, while he had five children including a newborn baby, and his wife was not working. (R.
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351:78:21-23.) Mr. Grimes borrowed money from his brother for living expenses and to cover
rent on a new office for his private practice. (R. 164, 167.) During this time, Mr. Grimes left Mr.
Holland's employ and took on Mr. Riordan's case. Mr. Grimes' first months as a solo
practitioner were no kinder, however. He had a hard time finding clients and income. At
Christmas, Mr. Grimes was unable to afford presents for his children. (R. 167.)
Mr. Grimes' financial problems were compounded by troubles at home. He so dreaded
discussing finances with his wife that he began to sleep elsewhere. (R. 168.) He and his wife
entered into marriage counseling, and Mr. Grimes sought treatment for his own depression. (R.
351:79:7-14.) He broke his ankle and had to cover hospital bills. (R. 168.) Worst of all, Mr.
Grimes' youngest son was born with pneumonia and hospitalized in the intensive care unit for
nearly a month. (R. 164, 174-5.) As a result of the personal, emotional, and financial troubles
weighing on him, Mr. Grimes became severely depressed. (R. 168.) He even contemplated
suicide (R. 168.) Mr. Grimes personal, financial, and emotional difficulties coincided with the
period where he failed to keep in touch with Mr. Riordan. (R. 3 51:81:1 -13.)
Fourth, Mr. Grimes had developed a good reputation for hard honest work in the field of
criminal defense since handling Mr. Riordan's case. At Mr. Grimes' sanction hearing, a number
of attorneys testified to his sterling reputation as a lawyer in the criminal defense bar. (See R.
312; see also R. 351:13-69.) Mr. Grimes has also become a pillar of the defense community
through his volunteer work. He serves on the legislative committee of the United Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (UACDL), gives CLE presentations on victims' rights in domestic
violence cases, sits on a panel that provides free legal advice to victims of domestic violence, and
14
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often takes cases pro bono or on a reduced fee. (R. 351:96-98.)
Fifth, Mr. Grimes has made interim reform to the way he practices law. He has removed
himself completely from the practice of civil law in the wake of his misconduct and no longer
handles client funds. (R. 351:98-99.) Mr. Grimes has also learned a lot more about how to
practice law since his mishandling of the Riordan matter. He no longer falls into patterns of
avoidance, and he has a support network to contact in the rare instance where he does not know
how to handle a case. (R. 3 51:100-101.)
Finally, Mr. Grimes expressed remorse by admitting to his misdeeds, that he was not
honest with Mr. Riordan, that he has no excuse for his conduct, that he was morally and ethically
wrong, and that he owes Mr. Riordan $7,070 plus interest. See Order of Sanction at pp. 9-10. Mr.
Grimes understands that he was wrong to let his disputes with Mr. Holland over finances affect
Mr. Riordan. (R. 351:101.)
2.

Mr. Grimes' case is distinguishable from Utah
misappropriations cases where disbarment has been issued.

Although a handful of cases have repeated the rule that presumptive disbarment for
misappropriation of funds may be overcome by compelling mitigating circumstances, no Utah
case has specifically defined a set of circumstances that would be considered compelling enough
to warrant departure. Nonetheless, Mr. Grimes' misconduct is distinguishable from each case
where disbarment was issued, including those cited by the OPC. In each case, the misconduct
was more severe than that of Mr. Grimes and the mitigating circumstances less compelling.
The OPC relies on Matter of Discipline ofBabilis, 951 P.2d 207. In that case, Babilis
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misrepresented himself as an expert in probate law despite having little experience in the field.
See id. at 208. He also set himself up both as personal representative of his client's estate and as
the attorney for an action involving that estate, a clear conflict of interest. See id. at 210.
Ultimately, he misappropriated a total of $78,659.43 from his client's estate. See id. He covered
his misdeeds with dishonest billing practices and also lied to the probate court as to the extent of
his client's assets. See id. The Court found "the record is replete with examples of deceit,
dishonesty, and misrepresentation, all motivated by Babilis1 desire to enrich himself." See id. at
216. Additionally, the conduct was part of "an established pattern of misconduct that
encompassed not only the [present] case but also his dealings with other clients, so that this was
one of multiple instances of misconduct." See id. Notably, the district court in Babilis found no
mitigating factors to justify departing from the presumptive sanction. See id. at p. 216, fh 19.
Mr. Grimes' misconduct was much less severe than that of Babilis. Babilis
misappropriated more than ten times the amount of money as Mr. Grimes. Babilis engaged in a
pattern of deceit before his client and the court to cover his misdeeds, while Mr. Grimes stopped
communicating with his client but did not continue to deceive him for additional financial gain.
Babilis's misconduct was part of a pattern that encompassed multiple cases and dealings with
other clients, while Mr. Grimes' mishandling of funds was a one-time occurrence in the
beginning of his career. Finally, the court in Babilis found no mitigating circumstances sufficient
to warrant departure from the presumptive sanction. The district court in Mr. Grimes' case
enumerated several such factors, described above. While Babilis did present evidence of personal
and emotional difficulties, the court was unwilling to treat them as mitigating because "those
16
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problems were of Mr. Babilis' own making" and did not excuse his behavior. See id. Here, in
contrast, Mr. Grimes was dealing with the hospitalization of his infant child and depression,
external problems that were not of his own making.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is In re Discipline of Johnson. 48 P.3d 881 (Utah
2001). There, Mr. Johnson's misconduct was admittedly more similar to that of Mr. Grimes. Mr.
Johnson refused to return an unused portion of a client's retainer in the amount of $28,880 and
converted it to his personal use. See id. at 883. Mr. Johnson also allegedly settled a case without
his client's permission, which caused the dispute over the retainer. See id. The Court recognized
that Mr. Johnson's conduct was less severe than that of other attorneys who had been disbarred
for misappropriating funds, but held "disbarment was the appropriate remedy under our case law
because there were no substantial mitigating circumstances." See id. at 884 (emphasis added).
Mr. Johnson's case represents the least severe instance of misappropriation for which the
Utah Supreme Court has upheld disbarment, and Mr. Grimes' misconduct was significantly less
egregious. Mr. Johnson misappropriated more than four times more money than Mr. Grimes and
continued to dispute that his client was owed the money even after disciplinary action was
initiated. Furthermore, the district court in Johnson found no substantial mitigating factors and,
indeed, cited the lack of mitigating factors as the reason disbarment was appropriate despite the
relative lack of severity of Mr. Johnson's conduct. See id. at 884. Here, in contrast, the court
enumerated several mitigating factors it considered significant enough to warrant departure from
the presumptive sanction.
Accordingly, although this Court has never stated a bright line rule for what mitigating
17
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circumstances would be considered compelling enough to warrant departing from disbarment in
a misappropriation case, Mr. Grimes' misconduct, while serious, falls below even the least
severe instance of misappropriation for which this Court has upheld disbarment. Moreover, the
numerous significant mitigating circumstances relied on by the district court set Mr. Grimes' case
apart from other precedent where fewer or no significant mitigating factors were found.
3.

Mr. Grimes' case is similar to misappropriation cases from
foreign jurisdictions where suspension was imposed.

A number of courts in foreign jurisdictions have imposed suspension rather than
disbarment when a lawyer engaged in misconduct similar to that of Mr. Grimes. For example, in
Edwards v. State Bar of California, 801 P.2d 396 (Cal. 1990), Mr. Edwards, an attorney with no
prior record of discipline before the bar, misappropriated approximately $3,000 of his client's
money from a trust fund in order to save his own home from foreclosure. See id. at 398-9. When
Mr. Edwards' client tried to deposit a check drawing on the trust, it bounced. See id. at 398. Mr.
Edwards informed his client that he had drawn from the account and eventually repaid the
money, but the delay caused his client harm in that she was unable to start a business while the
money was missing. See id. The disciplinary hearing panel found that Mr. Edwards had failed to
maintain proper trust account records and to promptly repay his client. See id. at 399. The
Supreme Court separately concluded that Mr. Edward's conduct amounted to willful
misappropriation. See id. at 401. In mitigation, Mr. Edwards testified to his financial difficulties
at the time of the misappropriation and that he had ceased all comingling of funds and now
employed a certified public accountant to manage his trust account. See id. at 399.
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The California Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the usual penalty for willful
misappropriation was disbarment. See id. at 402. But the court also cautioned that "'willful
misappropriation' covers a broad range of conduct varying significantly in the degree of
culpability", and "extenuating circumstances" or "compelling mitigating circumstances relating
to the attorney's background or character or to unusual difficulties the attorney was experiencing
at the time" could be sufficient to warrant a lesser punishment. See id. In Mr. Edwards' case, the
Court held disbarment was unnecessary to serve the purposes of attorney discipline. See id. at
403. "Petitioner had not been disciplined before, and therefore . . . we have no evidence that a
sanction short of disbarment is inadequate to deter future misconduct and protect the public." See
id. Additionally, Mr. Edwards had repaid the money owed, been candid and cooperative
throughout the proceedings, and voluntarily took steps to improve his management of client
funds in the wake of his misconduct. See id. Accordingly, the Court held suspension was
sufficient to protect the public, the courts, and the standards of the legal profession. See id.
Mr. Grimes' case is similar to Mr. Edwards' in a number of respects. Neither attorney had
a prior record of discipline before the bar, and the amount of misappropriated funds in each case
was comparably low. Also, Mr. Grimes, like Mr. Edwards, has taken numerous voluntary steps to
correct his behavior, including removing himself from civil law and the management of client
funds all together. Although California courts have not recognized the "compelling mitigating
circumstances" test as a hard-line rule in misappropriation cases, the Edwards court did start with
a presumption of disbarment before considering the "extenuating circumstances" that made
19
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suspension more appropriate. See id. at 402-403. Accordingly, it applied a similar test to Mr.
Edwards' misconduct as the district court in this case applied to Mr. Grimes'.
In contrast to Mr. Edwards, however, Mr. Grimes suffered an extreme amount of
emotional turmoil at the time of his misconduct, resulting from marital difficulties, financial
hardship, the hospitalization of his infant son, and severe depression, which further serves to
mitigate his actions. In the Washington D.C. case/ft re Cappell, 866 A.2d 784 (D.C. 2004), Mr.
Cappell used funds from his clients' trust accounts for business and personal expenses. See id. at
784. At the time, Mr. Cappell suffered form major depression caused by the breakup of his
marriage and significant health problems. The review Board found that Mr. Cappell's
misconduct would not have occurred but for his depression. See id. at 785. Mr. Cappell had
candidly admitted to and taken responsibility for his actions, and he was seeking treatment for the
depression. See id. He had also begun working with a financial monitor to avoid further
mismanaging his trust funds. See id. Considering those mitigating circumstances, the Board
issued probation instead of disbarment, and the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the ruling. See id.
The Court relied on a line of cases involving alcoholism that held departure from disbarment was
warranted where an attorney's misconduct was caused by alcohol abuse, if the attorney had since
gained control of his alcoholism sufficient to suggest the misconduct would not occur again. See
id.; see also In Re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C. 1987). The Court deemed the same reasoning
appropriate in cases where severe depression had caused the misconduct. See id.
That reasoning applies equally well to Mr. Grimes' case. Mr. Grimes was suffering from
severe depression when he engaged in his misconduct. Mr. Grimes emotional problems were so
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severe that he had even considered suicide. (R. 168.) The district court expressly cited evidence
of Mr. Grimes' depression and the hospitalization of his infant son as mitigating circumstances
weighing in favor of departure from disbarment. See Order of Sanction at p. 10. Mr. Grimes, like
Mr. Cappell, has sought counseling to address his emotional issues and prevent further instances
of misconduct. The district court did not expressly find that Mr. Grimes' emotional turmoil
caused his misconduct, as would be required under D.C. caselaw, but Utah has never applied
such a causation standard. Instead, the Standards for Lawyer Sanctions specifically mention
"personal and emotional problems" as a mitigating circumstance that may "justify a reduction in
the degree of discipline used." See Rule 14-607(b)(3). The district court correctly identified Mr.
Grimes' emotional issues at the time of his misconduct as compelling mitigating circumstances
weighing in favor of departure from the presumptive sanction.
c. The District Court properly considered Crawley and the interest of
justice in imposing its sanction.
The district court applied reasoning from this Court's decision in In re Discipline of
Crawley, 2007 UT 44, 164 P.3d 1232, when crafting its sanction in this case. The OPC argues
the court's invocation of Crawley indicates it departed from the "compelling mitigating
circumstances" test described above, and that any use of Crawley in crafting sanctions is not
allowed when willful misappropriation is at issue. See Brief of the Petitioner/Appellant at p. 13.
Both of the OPC's arguments related to Crawley are without merit.
First, the OPC argues the district court departed from the "compelling mitigating
circumstances" test by relying on Crawley to craft its sanction. The district court's order,
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however, indicates the opposite. Judge Dever's order explains that the Standards presume
disbarment absent "truly compelling mitigating circumstances" in cases of misappropriation and,
indeed, cites to In re Ennega when explaining this rule—the same case relied on by the OPC in
much of its Brief. See Order of Sanction at p. 9. The court then goes on to identify the mitigating
circumstances at issue in Mr. Grimes' case, suggesting the court was applying those mitigating
circumstances to the test it had just annunciated. See Order of Sanction at p. 9-11. The OPC is
correct that the court never expressly states that it has found those circumstances "truly
compelling," but the logic of the court's order is clear. First, the district court explains that the
presumptive sanction in misappropriation cases is disbarment absent "compelling mitigating
circumstances;" then it lists a series of mitigating circumstances weighing against disbarment;
and finally, it concludes by departing from disbarment and issuing suspension and probation with
terms tailored to serve the interest of justice. A sensible reading of that order suggests that Judge
Dever considered the mitigating factors he listed sufficiently compelling to meet the test. The
OPC would have this Court believe that, by invoking Crawley in the Conclusion of its order, the
district court had somehow forgotten the test it annunciated and applied just two pages prior.
It is much easier to believe that the court deliberately used Crawley in conjunction with
the "compelling mitigating circumstances" test to craft an appropriate individualized sanction for
Mr. Grimes' particular case. Indeed, this is the very purpose for which the Crawley decision was
intended. There, the OPC challenged the district court's ability to issue probation in cases calling
for more severe forms of discipline and asked this Court to adopt specific guidelines detailing
when probation could be used. See Crawley, 2007 UT 44 ^ 21. Specifically, the OPC asked the
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Court to deny probation in cases where the misconduct was "knowing or intentional," such as
this one. The Court declined to do so, holding:
We are satisfied-indeed pleased-with the discretion currently being exercised by
district courts in sanctioning attorneys for misconduct. It is a delicate and often
difficult task to craft sanctions appropriate for individual attorneys, no two of
which have engaged in the same misconduct under the same aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. The standards permit flexibility and creativity in
assigning sanctions, and the district courts have embraced this approach.

Our district court judges do a remarkable job of fulfilling a stated purpose of the
standards-protecting the public and the administration of justice-while still
providing the opportunity, when appropriate, for attorney rehabilitation. Were we
to limit the circumstances under which probation is available, we would very
likely undermine the ability of the district courts to so effectively maintain this
balance.
Id. at f 22 (internal quotations omitted).
The Court in Crawley expressly declined to place any limit on the circumstances under which
probation might be an appropriate part of an individualized sanction. Accordingly, the OPC's
contention that Crawley "is not correctly applicable to misappropriation cases" is without merit
and contrary to the Court's ruling. Indeed, as Crawley was decided after the misappropriation
cases relied on by the OPC, the Court would likely have made it clear if it intended Crawley to
stand separately from those other cases. It did not do so.
The district court, then, was entirely justified in using Crawley's "triangle of justice,
protection, and rehabilitation" in crafting its sanction in this case, after detailing the mitigating
circumstances that warranted departure from presumptive disbarment. The district court
appropriately ordered suspension and used Crawley's logic to craft probationary terms that
23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

protect the public while still giving Mr. Grimes a chance to rehabilitate himself. The
probationary terms require Mr. Grimes to report to a supervising attorney approved by the OPC,
who will monitor all retainers received by Mr. Grimes and report to the court and the OPC
monthly for six months and quarterly thereafter on Mr. Grimes' rehabilitation. It is difficult to
fathom how Mr. Grimes could be a danger to the public under these probationary terms, nor what
the public would gain from his disbarment.
CONCLUSION
Although Mr. Grimes misconduct was serious, it is tempered by a number of mitigating
circumstances that distinguish his case from those where disbarment has been ordered. The
district court recognized the specific circumstances weighing on Mr. Grimes and imposed a
sanction tailored to meet them. The district court's sanction appropriately serves the purposes of
attorney discipline and honors the prior rulings of this Court. Accordingly, Mr. Grimes requests
this Court uphold the district court's ruling.

DATED this 4th day of August, 2011.
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE, LLC

-A &js ffaJ*

V

Gregory GTSfoordas
Attorney for Appellee

24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the j day of August, 2011,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT/APPELLEE to be delivered to
the following:
Adam C. Bevis
Assistant Council
Billy L.Walker
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant

J)^n^ScyU£^t^
Skordas, Caston & Hyde

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

